Omschrijving
Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are--an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses why we should be moral.
I really enjoyed reading a dense and clear book that has been reworked so thoroughly over an extended amount of time. The thesis is surprising and ambitious.
In this lucidly written monograph, Julia Markovits addresses two of the central questions of practical philosophy. First, what are reasons? ... Second, what reasons do we have? ... The book deserves thoughtful engagement ... Markovits writes with extraordinary clarity and concision, ranges over fundamental issues about practical reason, moral psychology and moral philosophy, interacts thoughtfully with some of the best literature in these areas, and makes many compelling points, and more that deserve serious consideration, along the way. Contemporary moral philosophers need to wrestle with the relationships among the approaches she considers, and Markovits' own attempt to do so here makes her a valuable partner in this enterprise
It is an essential book for every philosopher working in philosophy of action, metaethics or moral theory.
Julia Markovits is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she has taught since 2009. Before she came to MIT, she spent three years as a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows. She studied philosophy as an undergraduate at Yale University, and then completed a B.Phil (2003) and a D.Phil (2006) in philosophy at the University of Oxford.