This book offers a novel theory of rights based on two distinct views. The first—the value view of rights—argues that for a person to have a right is to be valuable in a certain way, or to have a value property.
"This book will be of great interest not only to analytically oriented moral philosophers, but also to political and legal philosophers with an interest in the meta-ethical and normative-ethical analyses of rights. Alm masters the contemporary debates on the nature, contents and grounds of moral rights. In addition, his hybrid view offers a plausible solution to the puzzle of how to reconcile the phenomenon of the loss of moral rights with the idea that moral rights are inalienable because we possess them in virtue of our personhood." – Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
"David Alm’s value theory provides a fascinating and important competitor to will and benefit theories. It attempts to solve the central problems that plague these competitor theories and does so in a way that that connects rights to autonomy, reasons, and morality in general. Rights theorists will greatly enjoy discussing Alm’s innovative approach."– Stephen Kershnar, SUNY-Fredonia, USA